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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[W]e are just one race here.  It is American.”1  Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence in Adarand v. Pena (Adarand III)2 supported the view that 
equal protection under the Constitution requires that all people are 
treated equal, without regard to race.  Justice Harlan first articulated this 
view over 100 years ago, in his 1896 dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.3  
With his famous words “[o]ur Constitution is colorblind, and neither 
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,” Justice Harlan’s view was 
forward-looking at the time, but still resonates today.4 
Recently, state and local governments have implemented 
affirmative action programs in the employment context.5  One type of 
affirmative action program is race-based, with the goal of ensuring 
equality so that our nation’s racially biased history does not repeat.6  But, 
                                                                                                                       
 1 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand III), 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 2 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 3 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 4 Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 5 See e.g. H.B. Rowe Co. v. Tippett, 615 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2010); N. Contracting 
Inc., v. Illinois, 473 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2007); Jana-Rock Constr. v. New York, 438 
F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2006); W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. DOT, 407 F.3d 983, 995 (9th 
Cir. 2005); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. DOT, 345 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir. 2003); 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater (Adarand IV), 228 F.3d 1147, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000); 
Tenn. Asphalt Co. v. Farris, 942 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991); Geod Corp. v. N.J. Transit 
Corp., 678 F. Supp. 2d 276 (D.N.J. 2009). 
 6 See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 474 
(1986) (“The purpose of affirmative action is not to make identified victims whole, but 
rather to dismantle prior patterns of employment discrimination and to prevent 
discrimination in the future.”) 
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the Supreme Court has shown concern that these programs have gone too 
far and that there are ways to ensure equal opportunity for all without 
taking race into consideration.7  Therefore, to achieve true equality, the 
Court requires that race-based affirmative action programs, “imposed by 
whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by 
a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” 8  In other words, federal, state, 
and local governments must only implement racial classifications if 
supported by a compelling reason, such as eliminating purposeful 
discrimination, and must design their programs specifically to address 
that reason.9 
The review of government affirmative action programs has been a 
source of controversy for several decades.10  In Richmond v. Croson,11 
the Supreme Court required that a reviewing court apply strict scrutiny to 
state affirmative action programs.12  The Court then expanded its Croson 
analysis in Adarand III, where the Court held that a reviewing court must 
analyze any federal or state race-based affirmative action program under 
strict scrutiny.13 
In 1982, the federal government implemented an affirmative action 
program for minority-owned businesses.14  Congress reauthorized the 
program several times, most recently as the Transportation Equity Act 
for the 21st Century (TEA-21) in 1998 and as the Safe, Accountable, 
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users 
(SAFETEA-LU or “the Act”) in 2005.15  The Act requires state and local 
                                                                                                                       
 7 See id. at 476 n.48; see also Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 
(1989) (“There is no evidence in this record that the Richmond City Council has 
considered any alternatives to a race-based quota.”) 
 8 Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 227. 
 9 See id. 
 10 The confusion started in 1978, in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 
where Justice Powell applied strict scrutiny, but only Justice White joined him in this part 
of the opinion.  438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978).  Next, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, six Justices 
affirmed the set aside program, but could not agree on the level of scrutiny to be applied.  
448 U.S. 448, 483, 495, 518 (1980).  Three justices argued for strict scrutiny and three 
concurring justices argued for intermediate scrutiny.  Then, in Wygant v. Jackson Board 
of Education, the plurality employed strict scrutiny.  476 U.S. 267, 279–80 (1986).  In 
Richmond v. Croson, a majority confirmed a strict scrutiny standard of review, but only 
for state programs.  488 U.S. 469, 490–93 (1989).  In Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, the 
Court applied intermediate scrutiny for benign federal racial classifications.  497 U.S. 
547, 564–65 (1990).   
 11 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 12 Id. at 490–93. 
 13 See Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 227. 
 14 See Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 
2097 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 23, 26 U.S.C.). 
 15 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), Pub. L. No. 105-178, 
112 Stat. 107 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 16, 23, 49 U.S.C.); Safe, 
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recipients of federal transportation funds to operate affirmative action 
programs, specifically, Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) 
programs, mandating that each state spend ten percent of those funds 
with socially and economically disadvantaged individuals when 
contracting for transportation projects within the state.16  The purpose of 
SAFETEA-LU, according to the United States Department of 
Transportation (USDOT or DOT), is to “ensure nondiscrimination in the 
award and administration of DOT-assisted contracts,” “create a level 
playing field on which DBEs can compete fairly,” “help remove barriers 
to the participation of DBEs in DOT-assisted contracts,” and “provide 
appropriate flexibility to recipients of Federal financial assistance in 
establishing and providing opportunities for DBEs.”17 
Four circuits have reviewed the constitutionality of TEA-21,18 but 
no circuit has reviewed the constitutionality of SAFETEA-LU.19  These 
circuits addressed subcontractor’s challenges under the Fourteenth 
Amendment that the state statutes implementing the federal requirements 
are either facially unconstitutional20 or are unconstitutional as-applied21 
to them.22  The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, agreed that TEA-21 
                                                                                                                       
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users 
(SAFETEA-LU), Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005) (codified in scattered 
sections of 2, 5, 6, 15, 16, 19, 21, 23, 26, 31, 33, 42, 45, 49 U.S.C.). 
 16 119 Stat. at 1156. 
 17 49 C.F.R. § 26.1 (2011). 
 18 See N. Contracting Inc., v. Illinois, 473 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2007); W. States 
Paving Co. v. Wash. DOT, 407 F.3d 983, 995 (9th Cir. 2005); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. 
Minn. DOT, 345 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir. 2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater 
(Adarand IV), 228 F.3d 1147, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000).  For the purposes of this Comment, 
because the circuits reviewed the constitutionality of TEA-21, this previous name will be 
used when discussing the circuit cases, but otherwise this note will refer to the most 
recent act, SAFETEA-LU. 
 19 The Fourth Circuit reviewed a North Carolina statute that mirrors the SAFETEA-
LU statute in H.B. Rowe Co. v. Tippett, 615 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2010), but has not 
explicitly reviewed the constitutionality of the federal SAFETEA-LU statute. 
 20 A successful facial challenge requires the plaintiff show the law is unconstitutional 
in every application.  Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 
1184, 1190 (2008). 
 21 In an as-applied challenge, a successful plaintiff need only show that the statute is 
unconstitutional as-applied specifically to that plaintiff.  Richard A. Fallon, Jr., As-
Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1327 
(2000). 
 22 See N. Contracting Inc., 473 F.3d at 720; W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 995; 
Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 972; Adarand IV, 228 F.3d at 1182. 
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was facially constitutional.23  The Supreme Court, however, has not 
decided the facial constitutionality of TEA-21 or SAFETEA-LU.24 
Three circuits reviewed as-applied constitutional challenges and 
utilized the reasoning in Croson and Adarand III to TEA-21, resulting in 
a circuit split.25  The Eighth and Ninth Circuits permit as-applied 
challenges, requiring a state to demonstrate that it narrowly tailored its 
program.26  In contrast, the Seventh Circuit held that a state is not 
susceptible to an as-applied challenge because the state is an agent of the 
federal government and is not susceptible to challenge outside of the 
state exceeding its federal authority implementing the program.27 
This Comment shows that a state’s DBE program for federally-
funded state projects must be subject to strict scrutiny as articulated in 
Croson and Adarand III.28  States should not be immune to Fourteenth 
Amendment as-applied challenges, despite compliance with the federal 
statute and regulations for DBE programs established pursuant to 
SAFETEA-LU.  Part II describes SAFETEA-LU and the constitutional 
authority of the Act.  This part also defines the strict scrutiny standard as 
articulated by Croson and Adarand III.  Part III discusses the current 
circuit split between the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.  Part IV 
analyzes the approaches of the Circuits and argues how the Supreme 
Court should resolve the split.  This Comment concludes that a state 
DBE program, pursuant to SAFETEA-LU, is not immune from 
constitutional attack, but rather must be subject to strict scrutiny analysis 
in line with Croson and Adarand III, identifying its own compelling 
interest and narrowly tailoring its DBE program to achieve that interest.   
                                                                                                                       
 23 See W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 995; Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 972; 
Adarand IV, 228 F.3d at 1182. 
 24 Only Gross Seed and Sherbrooke Turf petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court from the Eighth Circuit, but it was denied.  Gross Seed Co. v. DOT, 541 
U.S. 1041 (2004); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. DOT, 541 U.S. 1041 (2004). 
 25 See infra Part III. 
 26 See Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 971 (“[A] valid race-based program must be 
narrowly tailored, and to be narrowly tailored, a national program must be limited to 
those parts of the country where its race-based measures are demonstrably needed.  To 
the extent the federal government delegates this tailoring function, a State’s 
implementation becomes critically relevant to a reviewing court’s strict scrutiny.  Thus, 
we leave this question of state implementation to our narrow tailoring analysis.”); W. 
States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 997–98 (“We also agree with the Eighth Circuit that it is 
necessary to undertake an as-applied inquiry into whether Washington’s DBE program is 
narrowly tailored . . . .  Whether Washington’s DBE program is narrowly tailored to 
further Congress’s remedial objective depends upon the presence or absence of 
discrimination in the State’s transportation contracting industry.”). 
 27 N. Contracting Inc., 473 F.3d at 721 (“Our holding . . . that a state is insulated 
from this sort of constitutional attack, absent a showing that the state exceeded its federal 
authority, remains applicable.”). 
 28 See infra Part IV. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. SAFETEA-LU 
1. A Federal Transportation Affirmative Action Statute 
SAFETEA-LU requires that at least ten percent of the money made 
available by the Secretary of Transportation for its programs “shall be 
expended with small business concerns owned and controlled by socially 
and economically disadvantaged individuals.”29  USDOT specified 
regulations for participation by disadvantaged business enterprises in 
USDOT transportation financial assistance programs.30  The regulations 
require each recipient31 of federal transportation funds to implement a 
DBE program that complies with SAFETEA-LU.32 
To qualify as a DBE, a firm must be owned and controlled by a 
majority of individuals who are “socially and economically 
disadvantaged.”33  The federal government presumes certain ethnic 
groups to be socially and economically disadvantaged, including Black 
Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific 
Americans, Subcontinent Asian Americans, as well as women.34  The 
state can rebut this presumption if the firm owner’s personal net worth 
exceeds $1.32 million.35  Furthermore, individuals not presumed socially 
and economically disadvantaged can apply for DBE certification, and the 
state must determine on a case-by-case basis if the individual qualifies.36  
The state makes the determination based on a number of factors set forth 
in the regulations, but generally determines whether an individual is 
socially disadvantaged if he has “been subjected to racial or ethnic 
prejudice or cultural bias within American society. . . .”37  Moreover, the 
state determines whether an individual is economically disadvantaged if 
he is a “socially disadvantaged individual[] whose ability to compete in 
the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital 
and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same or similar line 
of business who are not socially disadvantaged.”38 
                                                                                                                       
 29 TEA-21 § 1101(b)(1) (1998). 
 30 See 49 C.F.R. § 26 (2011). 
 31 In the context of this note, recipients of federal transportation funds will be 
referred to generally as the “state.” 
 32 49 C.F.R. § 26.21(a). 
 33 Id. § 26.5 (definition of DBE). 
 34 Id. § 26.21(a)(1). 
 35 Id. § 26.67(b). 
 36 Id. § 26.67(d). 
 37 Id. § 26 app. E. 
 38 49 C.F.R. § 26 app. E. 
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The regulations specify that the ten percent DBE utilization 
requirement established by the SAFETEA-LU statute is merely an 
“aspirational goal at the national level.”39  The statutory goal “does not 
authorize or require recipients to set overall or contract goals at the 10 
percent level, or any other particular level.”40  Rather, each recipient is 
required to set an overall DBE participation goal.41  The overall goal 
must allow participation by all certified DBEs and the state must not 
break down the goal into race, gender, or other categorical groups.42 
The regulations promulgate a two-step process for determining the 
relative availability of DBEs in order to set an overall goal.43  The first 
step is to determine a base figure for the relative availability of DBEs, of 
which the regulations list proposed approaches, including using DBE 
Directories and Census Bureau Data, bidders’ lists, or conducting a 
disparity study.44  Second, the recipient must determine if it is necessary 
to adjust the base goal.45  The adjustment is based on a number of 
factors, including the “capacity of DBEs to perform work” such that the 
final goal reflects the percentage of funds that the state will allocate to 
DBEs in the forthcoming fiscal year.46 
After determining its final goal, the state must project the portions 
of the overall goal that it expects to meet through race-neutral and race-
conscious measures,47 meeting the maximum feasible portion of its goal 
by using race-neutral measures.48  The regulations list several race-
neutral means, including the use of a defined bidding process, providing 
assistance in overcoming inability to obtain bonding or financing, and 
assisting DBEs to develop their capability to conduct business 
electronically.49  Once the state has determined its goal and its measures 
to achieve its goal, the state must send its methodology and evidence 
used to arrive at its overall goal to USDOT by August 1 of the preceding 
year.50  The goal is in place for the upcoming year and the state regularly 
monitors its programs to ensure compliance with the overall goal.51 
                                                                                                                       
 39 Id. § 26.41(b). 
 40 Id. § 26.41(c). 
 41 Id. § 26.45. 
 42 Id. § 26.45(h). 
 43 Id. § 26.45(c), (d). 
 44 See 49 C.F.R § 26.45(c). 
 45 Id. § 26.45(d). 
 46 Id. § 26.45(d), (e). 
 47 Id. § 26.45(f)(3). 
 48 Id. § 26.51(a). 
 49 Id. § 26.51(b). 
 50 49 C.F.R. § 26.45(f)(1)(i). 
 51 Id. § 26.37. 
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Additionally, each state must establish contract-specific goals to 
meet any portion of the overall goal that it cannot meet using race-neutral 
means.52  The state may only use contract-specific goals in those 
federally assisted contracts that have subcontracting possibilities.53  
Similar to the overall goal, the contract-specific goals “must not be 
subdivided into group-specific goals.”54  Contract-specific goals must 
cumulatively result in meeting any portion of the overall goal the state 
projected having to use race-conscious means.55  The state must also 
adjust its contract-specific goals in order to ensure that the state 
continually narrowly tailors its program.56 
2. Constitutional Authority of SAFETEA-LU 
The constitutional basis for SAFETEA-LU stems from Congress’s 
Spending Power.57  This Article I authority empowers Congress to “lay 
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States.”58  “Incident to this power, Congress may attach conditions on the 
receipt of federal funds.”59  The conditional receipt gives the recipient a 
choice to either accept the condition or forego the federal funding.60  This 
“Spending Power allows Congress to achieve its policy goals indirectly, 
using federal funds to incentivize state action.”61  But, the Court has 
placed limits on the federal government’s authority to induce the state to 
act.62  For example, Congress must have a clear statement of its 
stipulation and must condition the receipt of funds unambiguously, 
“enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of 
the consequences of their participation.”63  Further, Congress must relate 
the conditions “to the federal interest in a particular national project or 
program.”64 
                                                                                                                       
 52 Id. § 26.51(d). 
 53 Id. § 26.51(e)(1). 
 54 Id. § 26.51(e)(4). 
 55 Id. § 26.51(e)(2). 
 56 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(f). 
 57 Ross R. Fulton, “Our Federal System”: States’ Susceptibility to Challenge When 
Applying Federal Affirmative Action Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 687, 689 (2007). 
 58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 59 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). 
 60 Fulton, supra note 57, at 690. 
 61 Id. at 688. 
 62 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
 63 Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) 
(alteration in original)). 
 64 Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality 
opinion)). 
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B. The Equal Protection Strict Scrutiny Standard for Affirmative Action 
Programs in Government Contracting 
Two Supreme Court cases are fundamental in determining the level 
of scrutiny a reviewing court should apply when determining the equal-
protection constitutionality of a government-created affirmative action 
program: Richmond v. Croson65 and Adarand v. Pena (Adarand III).66  
Croson confirms that a reviewing court must apply strict scrutiny for 
state or local race-based programs.67  Adarand III expanded Croson and 
requires strict scrutiny review for federal programs.68 
1. State Affirmative Action Programs: The Croson Standard 
The Supreme Court held in Richmond v. Croson that state or local 
affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny analysis.69  In 
1983, the city of Richmond adopted the Minority Business Utilization 
Plan (“the Plan”), which required prime contractors to subcontract at 
least thirty percent of the dollar amount of the contract with Minority 
Business Enterprises (MBEs).70  Minorities included black, Spanish-
speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut persons.71  The Plan 
permitted waivers of the thirty percent set-aside requirement for 
exceptional situations when the prime contractor proved that it could not 
meet the requirements of the Plan.72  In September 1983, J.A. Croson 
Company (Croson), a prime contractor, challenged the constitutionality 
of the Plan after the city denied its waiver of the thirty percent set-aside 
requirement.73 
The Court held that the Plan was unconstitutional.74  The Court 
began its analysis stating that a state or its local subdivision has authority 
to eradicate the effects of discrimination within its own jurisdiction, so 
long as it is exercised within the constraints of section one of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.75  The Court determined that Richmond’s plan 
denied certain citizens the opportunity to compete for public contracts 
                                                                                                                       
 65 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 66 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 67 Croson, 488 U.S. at 490–93 
 68 Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 227.. 
 69 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493–96. 
 70 Id. at 477. 
 71 Id. at 478 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 483. 
 74 Id. at 511. 
 75 Croson, 488 U.S. at 491–93 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
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based solely upon their race.76  The Court applied strict scrutiny to 
Richmond’s plan.77 
In the compelling interest analysis, the Court concluded that 
Richmond made a generalized statement that there had been past 
discrimination in the contracting industry.78  Specifically, Richmond 
could not tie the thirty percent quota to any specific injury suffered by 
anyone.79  Additionally, none of the city’s findings, “singly or together, 
provide the city of Richmond with a ‘strong basis in evidence for its 
conclusion that remedial action was necessary.’”80  The Court further 
explained that states and their subdivisions cannot consider national 
findings that there has been societal discrimination in a host of fields, but 
rather must identify specific discrimination within their own jurisdiction 
before employing race-conscious relief.81  The Court stated that the 
inclusion of specific groups of which there was no evidence of 
discrimination suggested that the Richmond’s purpose was not in fact to 
remedy past discrimination, but rather a haphazard plan.82 
The Court had difficulty assessing whether Richmond narrowly 
tailored the Plan because the city failed to identify specific 
discrimination.83  The Court explained that in order to use race-based 
measures, the city should have first determined whether alternative race-
neutral measures could be successful to increase minority-owned 
business participation.84  The Court also stated that there was no apparent 
reason for a thirty percent quota when the city considered bids on a case-
by-case basis.85  The Court concluded that Richmond likely used the 
quota for administrative convenience.86 
Croson further articulated the measures that could be sufficient to 
survive strict scrutiny analysis.  First, the Court stated that an inference 
of discrimination could arise by the showing of a “statistical disparity 
between the number of qualified minority contractors willing and able to 
perform a particular service and the number of contractors actually 
engaged by the locality or the locality’s prime contractors.”87  Thus, in an 
                                                                                                                       
 76 Id. at 493. 
 77 Id. at 493–95. 
 78 Id. at 498. 
 79 Id. at 499. 
 80 Id. at 500 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 81 Croson, 488 U.S. at 504. 
 82 Id. at 506. 
 83 Id. at 507. 
 84 See id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 508. 
 87 Croson, 488 U.S. at 509. 
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extreme case, a narrowly tailored racial preference might be necessary.88  
Second, the Court stated that when there are “racially motivated refusals 
to employ minority contractors,” the city would be justified in providing 
appropriate relief to the victim of discrimination.89  Statistical evidence 
of a pattern of individual discriminatory acts may support a local 
government’s determination that broader remedial relief is necessary.90  
Third, the Court acknowledged that the city could employ a variety of 
race-neutral measures to increase the opportunities for small contractors 
of every race.91 
2. Federal Affirmative Action Programs: The Adarand III Standard 
In addition to holding that strict scrutiny applied to local and state 
governmental actors, the Supreme Court also held that strict scrutiny 
applied to federal governmental actors in Adarand III.92  In 1989, 
Adarand Constructors (Adarand) submitted the lowest bid to the general 
contractor, Mountain Gravel & Construction Company (Mountain 
Gravel), for the guardrail subcontract on a USDOT project.93  USDOT 
was subject to the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation 
Assistance Act of 1987, which required it to spend at least ten percent of 
its funds with socially and economically disadvantaged businesses, as 
defined by the Small Business Act (SBA).94  The SBA presumed social 
and economic disadvantage for certain minority groups, such as Black, 
Hispanic, Asian Pacific, Subcontinent Asian, and Native Americans.95  
The USDOT contract stated that Mountain Gravel would receive a 
monetary bonus for giving subcontracts to businesses owned by socially 
or economically disadvantaged individuals.96  Adarand was not certified 
as such a business and was denied the contract in favor of a business 
owned by a socially or economically disadvantaged individual.97  
Adarand brought suit alleging that the SBA presumption of social or 
economic ownership discriminates based on race and violates equal 
protection as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.98 
                                                                                                                       
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 93 Id. at 205. 
 94 Id. at 208. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 205, 209. 
 97 Id. at 205. 
 98 Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 205–06. 
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The Court analyzed whether the Fifth Amendment provides the 
same protection as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.99  The Court relied on Croson and held that “all racial 
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government 
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”100  
The Court reasoned that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect 
persons, not groups and therefore, there is no distinction between racial 
discrimination cases brought under either amendment.101  The 
Constitution prohibits all government action based on race, a group 
classification, or requires the government to implement a program 
narrowly tailored to the government’s compelling interest to ensure that 
the government does not infringe upon the right to equal protection.102  
The Court remanded the case to the lower court to apply strict 
scrutiny.103 
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT: IS A STATE’S DBE PROGRAM SUBJECT TO AN AS-
APPLIED CHALLENGE? 
Generally, the circuits agree that TEA-21, SAFETEA-LU’s 
predecessor, is facially constitutional and does not violate equal 
protection under the Fifth Amendment.104  The circuits disagree, 
however, whether a state is subject to an as-applied equal protection 
challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment.105  In the post-Adarand III 
era, there is a circuit split between the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth 
                                                                                                                       
 99 Id. at 213. 
 100 Id. at 227. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 237. 
 104 See W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. DOT, 407 F.3d 983, 995 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. DOT, 345 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir. 2003); see also 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater (Adarand IV), 228 F.3d 1147, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 105 Compare N. Contracting Inc. v. Illinois, 473 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Our 
holding in Milwaukee County Pavers that a state is insulated from this sort of 
constitutional attack, absent a showing that the state exceeded its federal authority, 
remains applicable.”), with W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d  at 997–98 (“We also agree 
with the Eighth Circuit that it is necessary to undertake an as-applied inquiry into whether 
Washington’s DBE program is narrowly tailored . . . .  Whether Washington’s DBE 
program is narrowly tailored to further Congress’s remedial objective depends upon the 
presence or absence of discrimination in the State’s transportation contracting industry.”), 
and Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 971 (“[A] valid race-based program must be 
narrowly tailored, and to be narrowly tailored, a national program must be limited to 
those parts of the country where its race-based measures are demonstrably needed.  To 
the extent the federal government delegates this tailoring function, a State’s 
implementation becomes critically relevant to a reviewing court’s strict scrutiny.  Thus, 
we leave this question of state implementation to our narrow tailoring analysis.”).  
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Circuits regarding as-applied challenges.106  The Seventh Circuit held 
that a state is not susceptible to an as-applied challenge because the state 
is an agent of the federal government and is only subject to a challenge if 
the state exceeded its federal authority in implementing the program.107  
On the other hand, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits permitted as-applied 
equal protection challenges, requiring a state to demonstrate that it 
narrowly tailored its program to survive strict scrutiny.108  These circuits 
agreed that a state’s DBE program must be susceptible to as-applied 
challenges in order to ensure that the state applied TEA-21 in a 
constitutional manner.109 
A. Eighth Circuit: Allowing an As-Applied Challenge 
The Eighth Circuit discussed its approach in Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. 
v. Minnesota DOT.110  The Sherbrooke Turf decision encompasses cases 
from the district courts of Nebraska and Minnesota.111  In the Minnesota 
action, Sherbrooke Turf sued the Minnesota Department of 
Transportation (MnDOT) and its commissioner.112  In the Nebraska 
action, Gross Seed Company (Gross Seed) sued the Nebraska 
                                                                                                                       
 106 Notably, two additional circuits have decided this question.  The circuits include 
the Sixth Circuit in Tennessee Asphalt Co. v. Farris, 942 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(challenging the 1982 version of the Act), and the Second Circuit in Harrison & 
Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1992) (challenging a 
1977 version of the Act).  The Sixth Circuit has not revisited its position on this matter 
post-Adarand III.  This distinction is noteworthy because these older decisions relied on 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Milwaukee County Pavers Association v. Fiedler, 922 
F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1991), which based its authority on Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 
448 (1980), the established Supreme Court case at the time.  Since the Milwaukee County 
Pavers decision, Adarand III subsequently overturned Fullilove, applying a stricter 
standard of review for race-based classifications in government contracting.  Adarand III, 
515 U.S. at 236.  “”Very recently, the Second Circuit took a brief look at New York’s 
DBE program post-Adarand III.  In Jana-Rock Construction v. New York, 438 F.3d 195 
(2d Cir. 2006), the court did not thoroughly review the program because the contractor 
was arguing solely that the state’s definition of “Hispanic” was unconstitutional because 
it did not include those persons of Spanish or Portuguese origin.  Id. at 200.  The court 
equated this to an under-inclusiveness challenge and determined that a rational basis 
inquiry instead of a strict scrutiny review was appropriate.  Id.  The court reasoned that 
Jana-Rock did not demonstrate that the exclusion was motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose and did not challenge the overall constitutional authority of the state’s 
affirmative action program.  Id.  Therefore, while the Sixth and Second Circuits positions 
might not have changed since the Adarand III decision, it is outside the scope of this note 
to hypothesize how these courts might review their decisions post-Adarand III. 
 107 N. Contracting Inc., 473 F.3d at 721; Milwaukee Cnty. Pavers Ass’n, 922 F.2d at 
423. 
 108 See W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 997; Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 971. 
 109 See W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 998; Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 971. 
 110 345 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 111 Id. at 967. 
 112 Id. 
430 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 7:417 
Department of Roads (NDOR) and its director.113  The plaintiffs alleged 
each state’s DBE program violated equal protection under the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.114  Sherbrooke Turf and 
Gross Seed are white male-owned subcontractor companies that provide 
landscaping services for general contractors on federally assisted 
highway projects.115  Both MnDOT and NDOR are federally assisted 
state highway programs.116  Sherbrooke Turf and Gross Seed lost bids on 
highway projects in their respective states due to each state’s DBE 
program.117 
The Eighth Circuit allowed an as-applied challenge to a state’s 
DBE program under TEA-21.118  In considering such a challenge, the 
Eighth Circuit required a state to have a narrowly tailored program 
subject to strict scrutiny, as ordered by Adarand III.119  The court 
reasoned that the national program in place is subject to strict scrutiny, 
requiring it to be limited only to those areas of the country where race-
based measures are discernibly needed.120  The Eighth Circuit allowed 
MnDOT and NDOR to adopt Congress’s compelling interest for 
implementing TEA-21, and neither Minnesota nor Nebraska was 
required to demonstrate a compelling interest.121  Thus, the court only 
reviewed the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny reasoning that the 
federal government delegated this prong to the states.122 
The court found that the MnDOT and NDOR programs were 
constitutional under the as-applied analysis.123  Both states followed the 
federal regulations by conducting DBE availability and capability studies 
in the highway construction market, setting an annual goal, and 
identifying the portion of that goal that required use of race-conscious 
means.124  USDOT approved both state programs in 2001.125  In its case, 
Sherbrooke Turf attacked the reliability of the data MnDOT used in 
determining its annual goal, but the court concluded that Sherbrooke 
                                                                                                                       
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 969. 
 115 Gross Seed Co. v. Neb. Dep’t of Rds., No. 4:00CV3073, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
27125, at *3 (D. Neb. May 6, 2002); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. DOT, No. 00-CV-
1026(JMR/RE), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19565, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2001). 
 116 Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 967. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 971. 
 119 Id. at 969. 
 120 Id. at 971. 
 121 Id. at 970–71. 
 122 Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 971. 
 123 Id. at 973–74. 
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Turf failed to show that better data was available for Minnesota’s use.126  
Instead, the court noted that even though MnDOT could not meet its 
overall goal with race-neutral measures, MnDOT adjusted its goals as the 
year progressed as required by the regulations.127  Further, the court 
identified that NDOR apportioned its contracting to race-neutral 
decisions and set an overall goal in compliance with the national 
program.128  The Eighth Circuit found both the MnDOT and NDOR 
programs constitutional as-applied to Sherbrooke Turf and Gross Seed.129 
B. Ninth Circuit: A Similar Eighth Circuit Approach 
In Western States Paving Co. v. Washington DOT,130 the Ninth 
Circuit heard a challenge from a white male-owned asphalt and paving 
subcontractor.131  Western States Paving Company (Western States) sued 
the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT), the City 
of Vancouver, and Clark County, alleging that Washington’s DBE 
program violated equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution.132  WSDOT receives 
federal funding for its transportation projects.133  Western States lost 
contracts to minority subcontractors despite presenting lower bids.134 
The Ninth Circuit allowed an as-applied challenge to the state’s 
DBE program under TEA-21.135  In Western States Paving, the Ninth 
Circuit determined that it must follow the Croson/Adarand III standard, 
applying strict scrutiny to Washington’s DBE program.136  The Ninth 
Circuit agreed with the Eighth Circuit, allowing WSDOT to adopt 
Congress’s compelling interest.137  The Ninth Circuit focused on the 
narrow tailoring prong to determine if Washington’s DBE program could 
overcome the as-applied challenge.138  In order for WSDOT’s program to 
qualify as a narrowly tailored program, the court required evidence of 
past discrimination in the state’s transportation contracting industry and 
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 128 Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 974. 
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 130 407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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specifically required the program to be “limited to those minority groups 
that have actually suffered discrimination.”139 
The court found that “Washington’s DBE program closely tracks 
the sample DBE program developed by the USDOT.”140  But the court 
did not find “any evidence suggesting that minorities currently suffer—
or have ever suffered—discrimination in the Washington transportation 
contracting industry.”141  Thus, the court concluded that “Washington’s 
application of TEA-21 conflicts with the guarantees of equal  
protection . . . .”142 
C. Seventh Circuit: No As-Applied Challenges Allowed 
The Seventh Circuit differed in its approach to an as-applied 
challenge to a state’s DBE program in disagreement with the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits in Northern Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois.143  Northern 
Contracting, Inc. (NCI) is a guardrail and fence subcontractor for Illinois 
highway construction projects.144  NCI is not a certified disadvantaged 
business enterprise.145  The Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) 
received federal funding from USDOT for its projects and implemented a 
DBE program.146  NCI filed an action for declaratory and injunctive 
relief against IDOT, its Secretary and Bureau Chief of the Bureau of 
Small Business Enterprises, and USDOT, alleging Illinois’s DBE 
program violated the equal protection provision under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.147 
The Seventh Circuit did not allow an as-applied challenge to the 
state’s DBE program implemented under TEA-21.148  The court agreed 
with the Ninth and Eighth Circuits allowing a state to rely on Congress’s 
compelling interest in implementing a DBE program.149  The court, 
however, differed from the Ninth and Eighth Circuits in its reasoning, 
limiting its inquiry to whether IDOT complied with TEA-21.150  The 
Seventh Circuit did not employ a narrow tailoring inquiry.151  Rather, the 
                                                                                                                       
 139 Id. at 998. 
 140 Id. at 999. 
 141 Id. at 1002. 
 142 W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 1002. 
 143 473 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 144 Id. at 717–18. 
 145 N. Contracting Inc. v. Illinois, No. 00 C 4515, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3226 at *7 
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court reaffirmed its pre-Adarand III holding in Milwaukee County 
Pavers v. Fiedler152 that a state insulates itself from constitutional attack, 
absent a showing that the state exceeded its federal authority.153  
Therefore, the court determined that a challenge to a state’s 
implementation of a federally mandated program must be limited to the 
question of “whether the [state] complied with the federal program 
regulations.”154 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court should resolve this circuit split by requiring a 
state to demonstrate its own compelling interest and implement a 
narrowly tailored program in order to survive a strict scrutiny analysis, 
remaining true to the Constitution and eliminating race-based programs 
in violation of equal protection.  States should not be immune to 
Fourteenth Amendment as-applied challenges, despite compliance with 
the federal statute and regulations for DBE programs established 
pursuant to SAFETEA-LU.  None of the circuit opinions adequately 
account for the strict scrutiny standard as articulated in Croson and 
Adarand III for appellate review of government race-based affirmative 
action programs.  The Seventh Circuit’s position that a state can be 
immune from constitutional attack155 violates principles of state 
sovereignty and undermines the Croson and Adarand III decisions, 
which is to ensure equal protection at every governmental level.156  
Additionally, the Eighth and Ninth Circuit approaches advocate for strict 
scrutiny but fail to apply the Croson/Adarand III standard.157  These 
                                                                                                                       
 152 922 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1991) 
 153 N. Contracting Inc., 473 F.3d at 721; see also Milwaukee Cnty. Pavers, 922 F.2d at 
423 (“Insofar as the state is merely complying with federal law it is acting as the agent of 
the federal government and is no more subject to being enjoined on equal protection 
grounds than the federal civil servants who drafted the regulations . . . . If the state does 
exactly what the statute expects it to do, and the statute is conceded for purposes of the 
litigation to be constitutional, we do not see how the state can be thought to have violated 
the Constitution.”). 
 154 N. Contracting Inc., 473 F.3d at 721–22. 
 155 Id. at 722. 
 156 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand III), 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) 
(requiring race-based programs enacted by every government to be “narrowly tailored 
measures that further compelling governmental interests”); Richmond v. J. A. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504–05 (1989) (requiring identification of specific past discrimination 
in furtherance of the state government’s compelling interest before a narrow tailoring 
analysis can be performed).  The Court entertained an equal protection Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge in Croson and an equal protection Fifth Amendment challenge in 
Adarand III, but the Court held that there is no distinction between claims brought under 
either of the two Amendments.  Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 213–14. 
 157 See W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. DOT, 407 F.3d 983, 997–98 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. DOT, 345 F.3d 964, 971 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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circuits do not complete a thorough strict scrutiny analysis, but rather 
allow a state to adopt Congress’s compelling interest.158 
A. A State DBE Program Cannot be Insulated from Strict Scrutiny 
Analysis 
The Seventh Circuit’s position that a state is an agent of the federal 
government and thus, is not subject to a strict scrutiny analysis is 
incorrect and violates state sovereignty.  The Seventh Circuit insulated 
IDOT from constitutional attack because IDOT was “acting as an 
instrument of federal policy.”159  Agency is defined as the “fiduciary 
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent 
to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s 
behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests 
assent or otherwise consents so to act.”160  The cornerstone of the 
principles of agency is that the principle has the right to control the 
actions of the agent.161 
In this context, the Seventh Circuit implies that the federal 
government, as the principal, enacted the TEA-21 program, and the state, 
as the agent, acted on behalf of the federal government, and is subject to 
the control of the federal government.  This proposition, however, 
violates the principles of state sovereignty set forth by the Supreme 
Court in New York v. United States162 and Printz v. United States.163  In 
those cases, the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that the states 
are not agents of the federal government, but rather the states are 
sovereign actors.164  The Court affirmed its decision in South Dakota v. 
Dole165 while acknowledging that Congress could place conditions on the 
receipt of federal funds to incentivize state action.166  But, the principle 
form New York remained that the “residents of the State retain the 
ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will comply . . . .  [S]tate 
governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s preferences; 
state officials remain accountable to the people.”167 
                                                                                                                       
 158 W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 997; Sherbrooke Turf Inc., 345 F.3d at 971. 
 159 N. Contracting Inc., 473 F.3d at 722. 
 160 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01(2006). 
 161 Id. § 1.01 cmt. c (“The person represented has a right to control the actions of the 
agent . . . the principal has the right throughout the duration of the relationship to control 
the agent’s acts.”). 
 162 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992). 
 163 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997). 
 164 Printz, 521 U.S. at 919–20; New York, 505 U.S. at 188. 
 165 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 166 Id. at 206. 
 167 New York, 505 U.S. at 168. 
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The SAFETEA-LU regulations place a condition on the receipt of 
funds from USDOT, incentivizing the states to employ a DBE 
program.168  If the state were a true agent of the federal government, 
however, Congress could instead require the states to perform on its 
behalf.  But, this is the very principle that New York and Printz expressly 
prohibit.169  Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that the state is 
insulated from constitutional attack as an agent of the federal government 
is in direct contradiction of the principles of state sovereignty. 
Moreover, this approach effectively undermines the purpose of 
equal protection under the Constitution.  Applying the Seventh Circuit’s 
agency principle, the court would not allow a third party subject to a 
state’s program to challenge the program’s constitutionality.  This 
approach is improper because each individual impacted by a government 
entity through a race-based program can challenge the program, as the 
Supreme Court has stated that “equal protection [is] a personal right.”170  
The fundamental purpose of equal protection is to ensure that 
government respects the individual right “to be treated with equal dignity 
and respect” such that the government does not use race, a group 
classification, as the sole criterion in decision-making.171  This requires 
the government to treat all people as equal Americans, without regard to 
race.172  Instead of continuing to rely on Milwaukee County Pavers, the 
Seventh Circuit’s pre-Adarand III decision, the court should have 
revisited its position in light of Adarand III.173  Thus, there is no 
                                                                                                                       
 168 49 C.F.R § 26.21 (2011). 
 169 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 925 (“[T]he Federal Government may not compel the 
States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.” 
(citations omitted)); New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (“Congress may not simply commandeer 
the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a 
federal regulatory program.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)); New 
York, 505 U.S. at 162 (“We have always understood that even where Congress has the 
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks 
the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”). 
 170 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand III), 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995). 
 171 See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
 172 See Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 213–18. 
 173 This issue is exemplified in a recent Illinois District Court case which denied a 
motion for a temporary restraining order prohibiting IDOT from entering into contract for 
repair work.  Dunnet Bay Const. Co. v. Hannig, No. 10-3051, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
29102 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2010).  The district court did not revisit the Seventh Circuit’s 
position in light of Adarand III, but rather referenced Northern Contracting as precedent.  
Id. at *2–3.  The court acknowledged that IDOT’s bid process was determined in 
accordance with federal SAFETEA-LU regulations and followed procedures as approved 
in Northern Contracting.  Id. at *2–3.  Dunnet Bay argued that IDOT modified its 
program by no longer allowing waivers, thereby turning the DBE goal into a rigid quota, 
but the court did not look further because it found that Dunnet Bay did not satisfy the 
elements for a temporary restraining order.  Id. at *10–14. 
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authority for the Seventh Circuit’s holding based on agency principles.  
Instead, the Seventh Circuit should have applied strict scrutiny in 
compliance with Adarand III. 
B. Narrow Tailoring Alone is Insufficient to Meet Strict Scrutiny 
The Eighth Circuit erred when it allowed Minnesota and Nebraska 
to merely rely on Congress’s compelling interest and limited the as-
applied review to a narrowly tailored analysis.  In Sherbrooke Turf, the 
Eighth Circuit analyzed a facial attack on a federal highway program, 
concluding that Congress conducted studies finding that there was 
widespread intentional discrimination in the contracting industry.174  This 
widespread discrimination is akin to general societal discrimination, 
which is impermissible under Croson.175 
In the context of government contracting, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged only one compelling interest—the need to remedy past, 
specific discrimination.176  This compelling interest specifically allows 
the government to use a race-conscious remedy when it is necessary to 
correct its own unlawful racial classification.177  For example, if a state 
department compensates black employees at twenty percent less than it 
compensates their white counterparts solely because of race, the state 
may correct this past, specific discrimination by raising the salaries of all 
black employees.178 
                                                                                                                       
 174 Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. DOT, 345 F.3d 964, 970–71 (8th Cir. 2003).   
 175 Croson, 488 U.S. at 505. 
 176 Id. at 504.  The Court acknowledged a compelling interest in enhancing overall 
diversity, but this has been limited to the education context.  See, e.g., Regents of Univ. 
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); Grutter v. Bollinger, 
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indicating that petitioner’s special admissions program is either needed or geared to 
promote that goal.”). 
 177 Croson, 488 U.S. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 178 Id. at 524. 
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But, if the government’s only goal is to remedy a long history of 
general racism, the Court will not find a compelling purpose and the 
government’s program will not survive strict scrutiny analysis.179  
Specifically, the Court has stated its concern that including racial groups 
in DBE programs that have never suffered from specific discrimination 
in the past suggests that the real purpose of the program was not to 
remedy past discrimination.180  It is even not enough for the government 
to allege a compelling interest to remedy past, specific discrimination if 
the government bases its evidence only on statistical disparities and 
possible inferences that racial discrimination caused the disparities.181  In 
order to remedy the effects of discrimination in government contracting, 
the government must show “a significant statistical disparity between the 
number of qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform a 
particular service and the number of such contractors actually 
engaged.”182  Therefore, to comply with the principles set forth in 
Croson, Minnesota and Nebraska should be required to demonstrate a 
compelling interest, identifying specific groups that have been subject to 
past discrimination and narrowly tailor its program to remedy those 
effects of past discrimination. 
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit failed to adequately address its 
reasons for allowing a state to adopt Congress’s compelling interest.  The 
court argued that the “[c]ompelling government interest looks at a statute 
or governmental program on its face.  When the program is federal, the 
inquiry is (at least usually) national in scope.”183  The Eighth Circuit 
cited no authority for its conclusion,184 likely because it is contrary to 
Croson and Adarand III.185 
                                                                                                                       
 179 See id. at 505–06 (“To accept Richmond’s claim that past societal discrimination 
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C. The Ninth Circuit had Proper Application, But a Flawed Explanation 
The Ninth Circuit’s language limited itself to a narrow tailoring 
analysis of Washington’s DBE program, but also articulated a 
compelling interest, sufficient to meet the strict scrutiny analysis 
requirement of Croson and Adarand III.  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit’s 
narrow tailoring analysis required evidence of past discrimination in 
order to survive constitutional attack.186  The court stated that 
Washington need not set forth a compelling interest for its DBE program 
independent of that identified by the federal government.187  But in its 
review, the Ninth Circuit required Washington to show that there was a 
need to apply a compelling interest in the state.188 
The Ninth Circuit required a showing of past discrimination in 
order to survive constitutional attack.189  The court stated that narrow 
tailoring “depends upon the presence or absence of discrimination in the 
State’s transportation contracting industry.”190  The court further stated, 
“[i]f no such discrimination is present in Washington, then the State’s 
DBE program does not serve a remedial purpose; it instead provides an 
unconstitutional windfall to minority contractors solely on the basis of 
their race . . . .”191  This articulation of narrow tailoring was actually a 
compelling interest illustration.  The compelling interest inquiry is an 
examination of the rationale for the state or entity to enact its program—
in other words, “assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal 
important enough . . . .”192  Thus, the Ninth Circuit conflated the narrow 
tailoring and compelling interest requirements of strict scrutiny. 
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s confusing language, the result was 
sound.  In its analysis, the court reviewed the Washington program and 
determined that WSDOT did not have a compelling interest for 
implementing its program because Washington failed to offer sufficient 
evidence of past discrimination in the transportation contracting 
industry.193  This meant Washington did not narrowly tailor its program 
and thus, was unconstitutional.194  While the court used narrow tailoring 
language to find that the program was not constitutional, its actual 
holding was based on the fact that the state had no compelling interest to 
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implement its program because there was no evidence of past 
discrimination.195 
D. The Supreme Court Should Apply Strict Scrutiny as Articulated in 
Croson and Adarand III 
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether a party 
can bring an as-applied constitutional challenge of a state’s DBE 
program implemented pursuant to SAFETEA-LU.  If the case were to 
come before the Supreme Court, it should allow these challenges.  The 
Court should comply with its precedential Croson/Adarand III strict 
scrutiny approach.  Strict scrutiny is necessary to ensure governments 
treat all persons equally as required by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution.196  In the words of Justice 
Scalia, “[w]hen we depart from this American principle we play with 
fire.”197 
The Court requires strict scrutiny because it is skeptical of 
affirmative action programs and the stigmatic harm that arises when the 
government creates classifications based on race.198  Race-based 
programs may reinforce stereotypes, aggravating the premise that certain 
racial groups are unable to achieve success without assistance, based on 
information that has no connection to individual merit.199  Furthermore, 
the Court is concerned that it is inequitable to force an innocent person to 
bear the burden of redressing a wrong that he or she did not commit.200  
Those individuals who think that racial preferences “even the score” do 
not further the goal of equality, but rather hinder the view of one 
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American race because this ideal reinforces injustice in our society.201  
For example, evening the score allows the government to compensate for 
its discrimination against a black man by discriminating against a white 
man the next time, but this process only creates perpetual discrimination, 
which still violates the principles of equal protection.202  Thus, unless a 
government reserves racial classifications for remedying a specific past 
wrong, the classifications may promote notions of racial inferiority and 
lead to a government of racial hostility.203 
But affirmative action programs are not per se unconstitutional.204  
Rather, “[t]he unacceptable vice is simply selecting or rejecting [persons] 
on the basis of their race.”205  Affirmative action programs can be 
successful when the government creates a program aimed at assisting the 
disadvantaged generally, because this type of program does not violate 
the Constitution.206  A race-neutral program does not take race into 
consideration and thus, does not violate equal protection.207  On the other 
hand, when the government creates a race-conscious affirmative action 
program, our equal protection jurisprudence requires reviewing courts to 
analyze those racial classifications under strict scrutiny.208  The Supreme 
Court’s concern is that if strict scrutiny is not applied, the court has “no 
way of determining . . . what classifications are in fact motivated by 
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.209  The 
“purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by 
assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to 
warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”210 
1. A State Must Exhibit its Own Compelling Interest 
Strict scrutiny requires an analysis to determine if the actor 
implemented its program narrowly to further compelling governmental 
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interests.211  The court must first analyze the state’s asserted compelling 
interest before determining whether the state narrowly tailored its 
program and complied with SAFETEA-LU and its regulations.212  
Absent evidence of this past discrimination for remediation, the resulting 
program is per se unconstitutional.213  A state must exhibit its own 
compelling interest and cannot rely on a federal compelling interest. 
In regards to SAFETEA-LU, the federal government bases its 
compelling interest for implementing SAFETEA-LU on a Congressional 
report identifying widespread intentional discrimination in the 
contracting industry.214  Because the federal government found 
widespread discrimination and not discrimination in each individual 
state, each state or other local recipient of federal funds must “possess 
evidence that their own spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of 
prior discrimination” in order to take remedial action.215   Each state 
“must identify that discrimination, public or private, with some 
specificity before they may use race conscious relief.”216  Therefore, in 
accordance with Adarand III and Croson, a state or other recipient of 
SAFETEA-LU federal funds must identify its own pattern of 
discrimination before implementing a race-conscious DBE program. 
2. Narrow Tailoring is More Than an Analysis of Compliance with 
SAFETEA-LU Regulations 
If a state or local government can justify a compelling interest for 
its race-based program, the next step is to determine if the state narrowly 
tailored its program to achieve those compelling interests.217  “The 
purpose of the narrow tailoring requirement is to ensure that the means 
chosen ‘fit’ the compelling goal so closely that there is little or no 
possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial 
prejudice or stereotype.”218  A court’s analysis of narrow tailoring 
includes the review of a number of factors: “the necessity for the relief 
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and the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of 
relief, including the availability of waiver provisions; the relationship of 
the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the 
relief on the rights of third parties.”219  The first factor requires analysis 
of race-neutral alternatives.220  The second factor requires the program to 
be appropriately limited such that it “will not last longer than the 
discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate.”221  The Supreme Court 
should apply these factors in order to determine if the state narrowly 
tailored its DBE program. 
Justice Scalia has made persuasive arguments for a narrow tailoring 
analysis.  Justice Scalia sets forth the notion of one American race, which 
is consistent with the Court’s overall equal protection principles.  He 
argued that the only way a state can act by race to ameliorate the effects 
of past discrimination is to eliminate a state’s system of unlawful race 
discrimination.222  Thus, if in the past, a state had a program that did 
differentiate based on race, the state may adopt a race-conscious remedy 
in order to correct this unlawful discrimination.223  But, once that 
problem is fixed and the state has established a racially diverse 
workforce, the government may no longer use a race-conscious remedy 
and must discontinue its race-based program.224 
Employing these principles in the context of government 
contracting, if there is evidence of unlawful discrimination, the states can 
develop a program, like the SAFETEA-LU disadvantaged business 
enterprise program, to correct the unlawful discrimination.225  After a 
state identifies a compelling interest for implementing a race-conscious 
DBE program, the state must narrowly tailor that program to ensure the 
program only remedies discrimination of those racial and ethnic groups 
that have been discriminated against in the past.226  Once the state has 
remedied this discrimination, the state must discontinue its race-
conscious program.227 
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Each of the aforementioned circuits included in its narrow tailoring 
analysis a determination of whether the state’s DBE program complied 
with SAFETEA-LU (as TEA-21) and the related USDOT regulations.228  
But this is not enough.  The SAFETEA-LU regulations provide sufficient 
flexibility to recipients, which must be monitored to ensure equal 
protection rights are not violated.229  For example, while SAFETEA-LU 
encourages states to set aside ten percent of federal funds for 
economically and socially disadvantaged individuals, the regulations 
specify that this ten percent amount is merely “aspirational” in nature.230  
Furthermore, in determining the overall base figure for the relative 
availability of DBEs, the regulations offer several options, but do not 
limit the goal setting to one of the numerated options.231  As a result of 
this flexibility, a recipient may choose a method, albeit prescribed by the 
regulation, that may not be narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling 
interest.  In other words, in merely complying with the federal 
regulations, states may apply a facially constitutional law in an 
unconstitutional manner. 
For example, if a court were to review a state’s program only to 
determine if it complied with the regulations, the Washington DBE 
program in Western States Paving would have survived constitutional 
challenge.  USDOT approved the WSDOT program, finding it complied 
with the regulations.232  The court acknowledged that Washington’s DBE 
program closely tracked the program developed by the USDOT.233  If the 
Ninth Circuit stopped here, acknowledging that WSDOT complied with 
the regulations, WSDOT’s program would have survived constitutional 
attack.  But, the court took its analysis one step further, finding that 
Washington did not evidence past discrimination in its transportation 
contracting industry, thereby finding WSDOT’s program 
unconstitutional.234  Without determining if a state narrowly tailored its 
program to remedy past discrimination, the overall goal of equal 
protection would be frustrated.  Thus, a court’s narrow tailoring analysis 
should be more than a mere examination to determine if the state 
complied with the federal regulations.  The court should further 
determine if the state employed race-neutral measures where possible 
and limited its program in time such that the program only lasts long 
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enough to remedy continuing effects of discrimination.235  This is the 
only way a government program can narrowly tailor an affirmative 
action program to survive strict scrutiny. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A party alleging a state’s unconstitutional application of a DBE 
program pursuant to SAFETEA-LU regulations is met with a different 
approach depending on if the party brings suit in the Seventh, Eighth, or 
Ninth Circuit.  The Eighth and Ninth Circuits allow as-applied 
challenges to a state’s DBE program and focus their inquiry on the 
narrow tailoring aspect of strict scrutiny.  The Seventh Circuit precludes 
an as-applied challenge, and instead limits its review to whether the state 
complied with the federal regulations.  None of these approaches are 
constitutionally sound. 
The Supreme Court should clarify the Croson/Adarand III standard 
as required for state-implemented DBE programs based on federal 
regulation.  A state DBE program, pursuant to SAFETEA-LU, is not 
immune from constitutional attack, but rather must be subject to strict 
scrutiny analysis in line with Croson and Adarand III.  To comply with 
this strict standard articulated by the Supreme Court, a state or other 
government recipient of SAFETEA-LU federal funds must exhibit a 
compelling interest, separate from that of Congress, by identifying its 
own pattern of discrimination before implementing a race-based 
program.  Additionally, the narrow tailoring aspect of strict scrutiny can 
include a review of the state’s compliance with the SAFETEA-LU 
regulations, but the analysis should not end here.  The court should also 
review to ensure the method chosen by the state corresponds to its 
compelling goal so narrowly that there is little or no possibility that the 
motive for the classification was based on factors of race.  This requires 
the use of race-neutral alternatives and a program that is limited in time 
such that it will only remain in effect to remedy the continual effects of 
past racial discrimination.  This is the only way to ensure that federal, 
state, and local governments treat all persons as American, the only race 
acknowledged by the United States Constitution. 
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